Good point. You are right that they could have changed something else along with the flash and removing the need to program the flash could have opened up an avenue that didn't exist before. As far as any security scheme goes, it's less a matter of if they can be circumvented then how much effort it takes. At the very least the human factor limits how secure any mechanism is. And I agree there has yet to be any demonstrated exploit of the LPC2000 protection. It's not clear how much effort has gone into trying to find one though. At 08:15 PM 4/23/2006 +0000, Danish Ali wrote: >But I think ROM/FLASH might make a difference. >Because Philips must somehow get the bootloader into FLASH. > - It might be that the JTAG is enabled at reset and the bootloader _must_ >turn off protection before a JTAG attack can take place. >And a blank flash bootloader does not do this. That appears to be a high probability given the reverse engineering published so far. > - It might be that Philips put in an extra probing pad (not bonded out) >that controls whether the JTAG is enabled or disabled at reset (and it >is merely a matter of belt-and-braces as to why the bootloader >explicitly re-disables it). From an earlier Philips post >3) How is Bootloader programmed for the first time? > >Via JTAG on a tester. JTAG is accessible in virgin devices. Once >bootloader is programmed and CRP is enabled the tester can't access >the JTAG. That suggests to me that there isn't an extra bond pad and suggests that the test at this stage might even be in package. Note that this fits very nicely with the reverse engineering published so far. The disagreement between antagonist comes from whether it is possible hijack the JTAG control of the CPU before the CPU van be turned off. So far, AFAIK, no one has demonstrated the possibility. I'm not sure anyone has even tried. Robert " 'Freedom' has no meaning of itself. There are always restrictions, be they legal, genetic, or physical. If you don't believe me, try to chew a radio signal. " -- Kelvin Throop, III http://www.aeolusdevelopment.com/
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Re: [lpc2000] Re: CRP (Code Read Protection) investigation by stepping through the boot loader
2006-04-24 by Robert Adsett
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