Lpc2000

--- In lpc2000@yahoogroups.com, Sean <embeddedrelated@...> wrote:
 > Yes, this is what I thought, so why then would a trashed (Philips) boot
 > loader cause JTAG to be nonfunctional?  I'd think if the boot loader was
 > completely trashed then there would be no effect on JTAG.

Philips said a trashed boot loader can cause JTAG to be nonfunctional.  I 
do not know what they had in mind, but my guess is that given there is code 
in their boot loader to disable JTAG, it is possible these get executed and 
stop tractional JTAG procedures from working.

 > The reason that I called the discussion academic is because it seems fairly
 > clear now that the CRP isn't something you should rely on if you really
 > don't want people to look at what you load into the device.

Other than your "academic" qualification, I could not agree with you more.

I know at least one client who pulled LPC out based on security 
assessment.  Likewise, I suspect that for those here who claim they trust 
CRP works until an exploit is posted, I think CRP security assessment is 
more an operational requirement than just an academic exercise.

Anyway, like many, I like to see this discussion cool to the back burner 
until, perhaps,  Philips comes back with some answers.  As far as I can 
tell, CRP is now back to the drawing board until the next hardware iteration.

Jaya 

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